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Pritchard calls his epistemological disjunctivism ‘the holy grail of
epistemology’. What this metaphor means is that the acceptance
of this thesis puts the internalism-externalism debate to an end,
thanks to satisfaction of intuitions standing behind both com-
peting views. Simultaneously, Pritchard strongly emphasizes that
the endorsement of epistemological disjunctivism does not commit
one to metaphysical disjunctivism.
In this paper I analyze the formulations and motivations of epis-
temological disjunctivism presented by Pritchard and McDowell.
Then I consider the most common argument for the claim that
epistemological disjunctivism can be held without the support of
metaphysical disjunctivism.
I conclude that the plausibility of epistemological disjunctivism
depends on the plausibility of metaphysical disjunctivism. If the
latter is false, the former postulates a set of conditions for epis-
temic justification that are impossible to be fulfilled.
“So it would be odd if knowledge could be had in virtue
of having a true belief based on evidence that merely
made it more or less probable that p.”1
1 Introduction: epistemic justification and the holy grail of
epistemology.
One of few things that everyone in the contemporary internalism-extern-
alism debate regarding epistemic justification seems to agree about is its
significance. This debate is commonly seen as metaepistemological, in
that it is not only crucial for our understanding of knowledge and truth,
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but also for establishing what is ‘the nature and goals of epistemological
theorizing’2.
What makes the dispute in question appear impossible to be resolved
is the fact that intuitions standing behind the competing views lead to
seemingly incompatible conclusions. According to epistemic internalism,
justification is fully determined by conditions internal to the subject.
Epistemic externalism, on the contrary, claims that justification is de-
pendent on factors external to the subject. Thus, if we compare my
present perceptual belief and the corresponding belief of my counterfac-
tual counterpart which is a brain in a vat, the justificatory status of our
beliefs will be the same from the internalist perspective, yet different re-
garding the externalist standpoint. This is because our beliefs are based
on subjectively indistinguishable experiences (i.e. our internal states are
identical), but I am perceiving whereas my counterpart is hallucinating
(i.e. the relevant external factors are different).
The above example, known as The New Evil Demon problem, was
primarily developed against externalism3. However, rather than making
one view more plausible than the other, it simply illustrates what the
bone of contention is. Of course, granting the externalist position seems
to deprive justification of its subjective accessibility, since the subjective
perspectives of mine and my BIV-counterpart are identical. Neverthe-
less, we certainly do not want to say that beliefs based on perceptual
and hallucinatory experiences can be equally justified, as the internalist
position seems to suggest. In effect, we find ourselves caught between
a rock and a hard place: either the warrant for knowledge delivered by
sense experience is strong but inaccessible, or it is accessible but very
weak (perhaps too weak).
Although reconciling internalist and externalist intuitions would lead
to potentially enormous theoretical benefits, such reconciliation, given
the above considerations, seems to be like eating a cake and still hav-
ing it4. This is precisely why Duncan Pritchard describes his attempt
to end the internalism-externalism impass – a theory called epistemo-
logical disjunctivism – as ‘the holy grail of epistemology, in that it is
offering a bona fide internalist conception of knowledge which is able to
nonetheless allow that the rational support that one’s belief enjoys can
be genuinely truth-connected and thus skeptic-proof’5. What the ‘holy
grail ’ metaphor means here is that the acceptance of epistemological
disjunctivism would bring the internalism-externalism debate to an end,
thanks to satisfaction of the intuitions standing behind both sides.
The general aim of this paper is to investigate the tenability of epis-
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temological disjunctivism. I agree with Pritchard that this thesis really
deserves the name ‘holy grail of epistemology’. However, from the fact
that a given standpoint is worth defending it does not necessarily follow
that it is defendable. I think that epistemological disjunctivism cannot
stand on its own and needs some additional argumentation. In particu-
lar, I argue that the plausibility of epistemological disjunctivism depends
on the plausibility of another kind of disjunctivism, namely metaphysical
disjunctivism. My argument has a form of abduction: there is no bet-
ter explanation for epistemological disjunctivism than its metaphysical
counterpart. Despite the fact that both views are embraced at different
levels of philosophical inquiry and endorsing one does not commit one
to holding the other, only the truth of both claims puts the holy grail of
epistemology in our hands.
In consecutive parts of this essay, I explain what epistemological dis-
junctivism is and analyze Pritchard’s argumentation in favour of this
claim (Part 2), compare Pritchard’s epistemological disjunctivism with
the original formulation of this view presented by John McDowell (Part
3) and finally give a rejoinder to the most common argument for the
claim that epistemological disjunctivism can be held without the support
of metaphysical disjunctivism (Part 4). I conclude that such support is
indispensable (Part 5).
2 Epistemological disjunctivism according to Pritchard
Pritchard identifies the holy grail of epistemology in the following way:
‘Epistemological Disjunctivism: The Core Thesis: In paradig-
matic cases of perceptual knowledge an agent, S, has per-
ceptual knowledge that f in virtue of being in possession of
rational support, R, for her belief that f which is both factive
(i.e., R’s obtaining entails f) and reflectively accessible to S.‘6
Although disjunctivism comes in many varieties, what is common to all
of them is the rejection of the so-called Common Factor Principle. This
principle, in turn, is a consequence of the well-known argument from
hallucination (and an analogous argument from illusion), according to
which for every perceptual experience one might have, there is a possibil-
ity of having a subjectively (phenomenally) indistinguishable experience
which is not a perception, but an illusion or hallucination. The Common
Factor Principle says that such illusions and hallucinations are experi-
ences of the same fundamental kind as perceptions from which they are
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indiscernible7. Examples of theories that follow this principle are in-
tentionalism and the causal theory of perception. According to these
theories, the difference between perception and hallucination lies not in
experiences themselves, but in their etiologies8.
Disjunctivism denies the Common Factor Principle by claiming that
there is a fundamental difference between perceptual and hallucinatory
or illusory experiences, even in cases where they appear identical from
the first person perspective9. What particular versions of disjunctivism
differ about is the fundamental property that makes the difference in
question.
Now, epistemological disjunctivism is a very peculiar variety of dis-
junctivism. It sees the discussed difference in the epistemic significance of
experience: perception endues the subject with the kind of epistemic jus-
tification that hallucination and illusion cannot provide10. Does it mean
that endorsing epistemological disjunctivism commits one to denying the
Common Factor Principle? Presumably, it would be an overstatement to
say that the truth of epistemological disjunctivism logically entails the
falsity of the Common Factor Principle. This is because epistemological
disjunctivism is a theory of epistemic justification, and epistemic justifi-
cation is a normative notion. It is up to us how we set the conditions a
perceptual belief has to fulfill in order to be justified. Thus understood,
an account of justification cannot have any bearing on the metaphysics of
experience. On the other hand, while being normative indeed, a theory
of epistemic justification cannot be formulated in a complete isolation
from the relevant issues in the philosophy of perception. Consequently, I
think that the truth of the Common Factor Principle makes epistemolog-
ical disjunctivism unfounded. Under this principle, no perceptual belief
can fulfill the high standard for justification required by epistemological
disjunctivism. I develop this thought in Part 4.
Anyway, at this point, the Pritchard’s definition should become clear:
the ‘paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge’ is a situation where S
enjoys a perceptual experience, and conditions necessary for having per-
ceptual knowledge are met (e.g. S is rational and not biased by delusions,
etc.). In such a case, S is being put into a position to have knowledge
through gaining a reflectively accessible and externally grounded (fac-
tive) warrant for a true perceptual belief.
Pritchard has good reasons to defend this thesis. One of them is the
aforementioned prospect of putting an end to the internalism-externalism
debate. The other is the riddance from the worry of radical scepticism:
’if epistemological disjunctivism were a viable theory then a potential
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route out of this problem becomes available, since we can now appeal to
reflectively accessible elements of our epistemic standings which entail
facts about the world’11.
However, the above enumeration of epistemological disjunctivism’s
bright prospects is obviously not enough to justify the endorsement of
this view. In fact, Pritchard’s convincement of its tenability is not widely
shared. The claim that it is possible to reconcile internalist and external-
ist intuitions is usually taken with disbelief: ‘is it really the case that a
subject can know through his reflective capacities alone what his reasons
are for a belief if those reasons are factive?’12 ‘Why suppose that my
reflectively accessible evidence must be provided by the factive mental
state of seeing that I have hands, rather than the non-factive mental
state of seeming to see that I have hands?’13.
Indeed, the core thesis of epistemological disjunctivism might seem
either trivial or dogmatic. On the one hand, it seems trivial because if a
genuine case of perceptual knowledge has ever taken place, its justifica-
tory element definitely was truth-connected and reflectively accessible.
On the other hand, it might be taken as dogmatic because it completely
ignores the sceptical threat of the aforementioned New Evil Demon sce-
nario. After all, it is not possible to know by reflection alone that one is
not a BIV, is it?
As it turns out, according to Pritchard, the impossibility to know
that one is not a BIV does not lead to the grim consequences that are
usually derived from it. He claims that ‘it is far from obvious on closer
inspection why possessing better grounds in favour of believing that one
scenario obtains rather than another known to be incompatible scenario
should entail that one thereby possesses the relevant discriminatory abil-
ities to distinguish between the two scenarios.’14 This is why he thinks
that perceptual beliefs of my BIV-counterpart are blameless, yet not jus-
tified15. It should be noted that the idea of epistemic blamelessness was
criticized by James Pryor, who pointed out that it overlooks the differ-
ence between rational and irrational subjects16. Nevertheless, the key
question is the following: why do we have ‘better grounds’ for believing
that the BIV scenario does not obtain? It is the response to this question
that explains why should I think of my BIV-counterpart as epistemically
blameless.
The response is this: we have better rational support for our ev-
eryday beliefs than for their sceptical alternatives (i.e. epistemological
disjunctivism is true) because our commitments to denials of sceptical
hypotheses are hinge commitments17. In order to substantiate the thesis
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of epistemological disjunctivism, Pritchard merged it with the idea of
hinge commitments. This idea is the highlight of Ludwig Wittgenstein’s
last book – On Certainty. According to Wittgenstein, ’[...] the questions
that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some proposi-
tions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those
turn.’18 Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, an expert on On Certainty and a pro-
ponent of the non-propositional reading of hinge commitments, describes
them as indubitable, foundational, nonempirical, grammatical, ineffable
and enacted19.
Pritchard endorses a similar interpretation of hinge commitments,
which he calls ‘non-epistemic’. On this reading, just as on the non-
propositional one, hinge commitments cannot be an object of knowledge,
since ‘there is no sense in which we can meaningfully talk of our hinge
commitments as being beliefs’20. Contrary to the non-propositional
reading, however, the non-epistemic interpretation still counts hinge
commitments as propositional attitudes, which explains why we are able
to recognize the logical relationships between hinge commitments and
ordinary beliefs21.
Thus understood hinge commitments, along with epistemological dis-
junctivism, make a very efficient theoretical tool for blocking both ways
radical scepticism might enter the picture, namely its closure- and under-
determination-based formulations. The former is based on the following
indispensable principle:
(1) Closure Principle: If S knows that p, and S competently deduces
from p that q, thereby forming a belief that q on this basis while
retaining her knowledge that p, then S knows that q.
From (1) and a seemingly plausible assumptions that
(2) One cannot know that one is not a BIV,
(2a) To have a perception entails not to be a BIV,
the sceptical conclusion follows that
(3) One cannot have perceptual knowledge.22
This generates a critical problem for epistemological disjunctivism. For
on the ground of the closure principle, if one has factive and reflectively
accessible support for one’s everyday beliefs, then one should know that
one is not a BIV. In effect, the truth of epistemological disjunctivism
depends on the falsity of (2). And to show that (2) is false seems to be
impossible.
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The underdetermination-based scepticism is an upshot of another
principle:
(4) The Underdetermination Principle: If S knows that p and q de-
scribe incompatible scenarios, and yet S lacks a rational basis for
preferring p over q, then S lacks knowledge that p.
Given (4) and a seemingly plausible assumption that
(5) One does not have better rational support for one’s everyday beliefs
than for their sceptical alternatives.
we arrive at the conclusion that
(6) One cannot have perceptual knowledge.23
Because the underdetermination-based scepticism is not committed to
(2), it is immune to our hinge commitments to denials of sceptical hy-
potheses. To put it differently, having such hinge commitments is com-
patible with not having better rational support for our everyday beliefs
than for their sceptical alternatives.
However, combining the idea of hinge commitments with epistemo-
logical disjunctivism allows Pritchard to solve both sceptical problems at
once. Since ’[...] all rational evaluation is essentially local, in that it takes
place relative to fundamental commitments [hinge commitments – P.Z.]
which are themselves immune to rational evaluation, but which need to
be in place for a rational evaluation to occur’24, the lack of knowledge
that one is not a BIV does not prevent one from knowing other things
(e.g. that one has hands). The appeal to hinge commitments enables
us to deny the inference from (2) to (3). And if the local rational sup-
port can be factive, as epistemological disjunctivism tells us, then (5) is
false. Consequently, it is not the case that our everyday beliefs and their
sceptical alternatives are equally justified25.
This is merely a very brief outline of an extensive, complicated and,
as far as I am concerned, quite convincing argument. Nevertheless, it
seems that in order to reach the holy grail, Pritchard made a certain com-
mitment that he did not wish to make – a commitment to metaphysical
disjunctivism.
According to metaphysical disjunctivism (most generally understood),
the fundamental difference between perception and subjectively indistin-
guishable hallucination (or illusion) lies at the metaphysical level. Per-
ception is not merely an internal state of the subject – it is the whole
relation between the subject and the object perceived. Hallucination, on
62 Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy (2014) 28: 55–74
the contrary, is a mere state of the subject, even if it is phenomenally
indiscernible from perception. In other words, the object perceived is
a constituent and not just a cause of a perceptual experience. This
constituent is not shared by the indistinguishable hallucination26.
Of course, endorsing epistemological disjunctivism does not automat-
ically commit one to holding metaphysical disjunctivism, as it would be
logically coherent to endorse the former and deny the latter. The reverse
configuration would be consistent as well. Therefore, Pritchard is right
when he writes that ‘epistemological disjunctivism does not in itself en-
tail metaphysical disjunctivism. For that the rational standing available
to the agent in normal veridical perceptual experiences and correspond-
ing (introspectively indistinguishable) cases of illusion and hallucination
are radically different does not in itself entail that there is no common
metaphysical essence to the experiences of the agent in both cases’27.
On the other hand, the core of Pritchard’s proposal is in the claim
that ‘a closure-style inference [...] on the Wittgensteinian account of rea-
sons [...] simply has no application to hinge commitments such as our
denials of sceptical hypotheses’28. But what is metaphysical disjunc-
tivism if not a denial of sceptical hypotheses? After all, what this idea
boils down to is precisely the claim that when I see my hands, I really do
see hands (macroscopic physical objects, aggregates of elementary partic-
ulars) and not hallucinatory images presented to me by the Evil Demon.
If this is right, then Pritchard makes an even stronger claim than the
majority of metaphysical disjunctivism’s proponents. Under his assump-
tions, metaphysical disjunctivism is a hinge commitment immune to ra-
tional evaluation. Exactly the same commitment is expressed by M.G.F.
Martin’s famous sentence concerning perceptual experience: ‘[n]o experi-
ence like this, no experience of fundamentally the same kind could have
occurred had no appropriate candidate for awareness existed’29. It is
quite ironic that being so reluctant towards metaphysical disjunctivism,
Pritchard eventually lands in the same basket with the most radical
proponent of this thesis.
An immediate objection to the above reasoning might be that Witt-
genstein was hostile towards metaphysics, and the idea of hinge com-
mitments belongs to the field of logic30. This objection does not help
Pritchard, however. Firstly, Pritchard’s considerations are not a mere
exegesis of Wittgenstein’s work31, so we should not be concerned whether
Wittgenstein himself would agree with all this32. Secondly, understand-
ing the appeal to hinge commitments as a mere reference to a rule of
grammar (i) is clearly in tension with the non-propositional character of
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hinge commitments and (ii) makes this idea susceptible to the alterna-
tive (and radically different) interpretation of hinges defended by Martin
Kusch33.
Kusch understands Wittgenstein along the following lines: however
’our very nature does not enable us to treat [epistemic relativism] as a
live option’, because ’[it] jars with our natural, naïve attitude to epis-
temic disagreements’, ’[a]ll indications are that Wittgenstein [neverthe-
less] took epistemic cultural relativism to be a live option’34. On this
interpretation, hinge commitments are culturally relative. Kusch argues
for the plurality of radically different epistemic systems. The fact that
the foundation of every such system consists of arational hinge com-
mitments is supposed to explain why people tend to be so unwilling to
change their epistemic systems35.
A particularly unwelcome consequence of Kusch’s interpretation is
that our hinge commitments to denials of sceptical hypotheses are cultur-
ally-relative. This conclusion strikes me as clearly false, for I have
never heard of a community believing that the world started to exist
five minutes ago, or that their hands are hallucinatory. Even the most
sceptically-oriented philosophers have no problem with using their hands
in their everyday lives. The disbelief in sceptical scenarios is clearly en-
acted in our everyday activity.
And yet it is hard to imagine how one could retreat from metaphysical
disjunctivism by weakening the interpretation of hinge commitments de-
scribed above without simultaneously making a concession to the Kusch’s
reading of On Certainty. As dogmatic as it may sound, the trust in our
perceptual capacities entailed by metaphysical disjunctivism endues us
with a strong criterion for evaluation of epistemic systems. Without such
a criterion, we are doomed to fall into epistemic relativism.
3 Epistemological disjunctivism according to McDowell
As it was mentioned in Part 1 of this paper, McDowell is the original
proponent of epistemological disjunctivism. Despite being inspired by
McDowell’s writings, Pritchard does not want his Epistemological Dis-
junctivism to be ‘a mouthpiece for a McDowellian epistemology’36. He is
interested in pursuing his own project, not in the exegesis of McDowell’s
work.
However, not much exegesis is needed to see that both philosophers
share the core thesis of epistemological disjunctivism, and Pritchard is
aware of that37. I take the following quote to confirm that McDowell is
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also in quest of the holy grail :
‘in a non-defective exercise of [a perceptual] capacity its pos-
sessor is self-consciously equipped with an indefeasible, and
so knowledge-constituting, warrant for belief about the envi-
ronment. [...] When a belief owes its status as knowledge to
a self-consciously possessed warrant, rationality is at work in
the self-conscious possession of the warrant [...]’38.
In other words, perceptual experience endues the subject with epistemic
justification that is reflectively accessible and externally grounded. De-
tails aside, the key claim is the same.
That said, the way both philosophers go about motivating this claim
is significantly different. As we have seen in Part 2, Pritchard is con-
cerned with the kind of scepticism that can be called Cartesian scep-
ticism, in that it feeds on the possibility that we cannot distinguish
through reflection alone a situation in which we have perceptual knowl-
edge from a situation in which we do not have such knowledge. This
possibility creates a worry that even if there is nothing wrong with our
perceptual capacities, there might be no world to be perceived, or this
world can be radically different from how it seems to be39. McDowell,
on the contrary, is worried about something else:
‘[...] since there can be deceptive cases experientially indistin-
guishable from non-deceptive cases, one’s experiential intake
– what one embraces within the scope of one’s consciousness
– must be the same in both kinds of case. In a deceptive
case, one’s experiential intake must ex hypothesi fall short
of the fact itself, in the sense of being consistent with there
being no such fact. So that must be true, according to the
argument, in a non-deceptive case too’40.
What this quote describes is a different kind of scepticism, namely
Humean scepticism. It is generated by theories of perception formu-
lated in alignment with the aforementioned Common Factor Principle.
If the nature of a hallucinatory experience is exactly the same as the
nature of a perceptual experience, as this principle implies, then a per-
ceptual experience is not capable to get the subject in touch with the
mind-independent reality. In other words, the Common Factor Principle
makes the difference between perception and hallucination irrespective of
the nature of these experiences, and it does it at the expense of stripping
perception of its capability to relate the subject with the world41.
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McDowell denies the Common Factor Principle by endorsing the the-
sis of epistemological disjunctivism. He explicates this thesis in the fol-
lowing way: all of our sense experiences belong to one genus of seemings.
However, seemings have two species: seeings (perceptions) and merely
seemings (illusions, hallucinations). The difference between the species
is that only seeings have the capacity to provide the subject with an
indefeasible and consciously accessible warrant for a perceptual belief,
and i.e. to put the subject into a position to gain knowledge about the
world. As maintained by McDowell, this is a necessary assumption, the
rejection of which would ‘threaten the very idea of perceptual knowl-
edge’42. Its adoption, on the contrary, ‘is not well cast as an answer to
sceptical challenges, it is more like a justification of a refusal to bother
with them’43.
Being aware of all that44, Pritchard still complains that ‘McDowell
himself offers so little argumentative support for [epistemological dis-
junctivism – P.Z.]’45. I think that this conciseness of McDowell’s argu-
mentation might be explained by drawing an analogy between him and
Martin. After all, Martin is also concerned with the Humean scepti-
cism46. If such analogy holds, then McDowell’s claim that ‘[t]here is no
making sense of perceptual appearances – the testimony of one’s senses
– without making sense of the possibility that the objective world can
be immediately present to the senses’47 is also indicative of the hinge
commitment to metaphysical disjunctivism. Of course, such hinge com-
mitment would refer to the general idea of metaphysical disjunctivism
introduced above, not to specific formulation of this thesis defended by
Martin. This is because McDowell accepts, while Martin denies the
possibility that a phenomenal character of perception and hallucination
might be identical48.
Interpreting McDowell as a metaphysical disjunctivist, though per-
haps controversial to some, is still a valid option49. Insofar as it is not
my primary aim here to offer an exegesis of McDowell’s work, the follow-
ing reading of his standpoint seems perfectly natural to me: a certain
species of experience (namely seeings) is capable of making the objective
world open to us while other species (merely seemings) is not. Seeings
endue us with the special kind of epistemic warrant (epistemological dis-
junctivism) precisely because they are capable of making the world open
to us (metaphysical disjunctivism).
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4 Epistemological disjunctivism and the causal theory of per-
ception
Pritchard decidedly emphasizes that embracing epistemological disjunc-
tivism does not commit him to metaphysical disjunctivism50. He refers
to a group of authors51 who argue that epistemological disjunctivism is
compatible with the causal theory of perception – a theory that stands
in contradiction with metaphysical disjunctivism. Indeed, both theories
radically differ with regard to the Common Factor Principle: the causal
theory assumes it, while metaphysical disjunctivism denies it. Under
the former, one and the same experience might be a perception or a
hallucination, depending on what is the causal chain that has led to it.
According to the latter, the difference between perception and halluci-
nation lies in the very essence of experience52.
Nevertheless, from the authors cited by Pritchard, only Alan Millar
provides a well-founded argument for the claim that epistemological dis-
junctivism is compatible with the causal theory of perception. Other
authors – Alex Byrne and Heather Logue, Paul Snowdon – support this
claim merely by indicating that McDowell is not a metaphysical disjunc-
tivist53.
In the present context, however, it would be pointless to debate over
what McDowell himself really thinks. As a matter of fact, any argument
from exegesis would be irrelevant here, since the question is not what so-
and-so has really meant by this-and-that. Rather, the question is: can
we make the epistemological disjunctivism a viable option? If giving a
positive response to this question requires endorsing a view that certain
philosophers would reject, so be it.
Much more attention has to be given to the argument proposed by
Millar. He admits that ’[t]he disjunctivist is right to think that experi-
ences under the traditional conception [the causal theory of perception
– P.Z.] do not have an intrinsic character that will suffice to explain how
perception makes demonstrative thought, judgment and knowledge pos-
sible’54. Nonetheless, he thinks that we still can account for all these
things without rejecting the causal theory of perception, provided that
we ’abandon the idea that experiences can bear the explanatory burden
that disjunctivists have placed on them’55.
Millar prefers to put this burden on the so-called perceptual-recognit-
ional capacities. Getting in ‘cognitive contact’ with the facts about the
world ‘is a matter of being in a relational state in virtue of the exer-
cise of those capacities’56. Such state is relational because a perceptual-
recognitional capacity counts as exercised only if knowledge is gained57.
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An exercise of such capacity is a successful (accurate) conceptualization
of a phenomenal material that experience provides the subject with58.
In effect, the term ‘perception’ is broader than the term ‘experience’,
because ‘perception’ refers to experience plus the exercise of a relevant
perceptual-recognitional capacity59. This, in turn, allows Millar to accept
the Common Factor Principle and simultaneously maintain that percep-
tion is essentially relational. If this conception is viable, the endorsement
of metaphysical disjunctivism is not the only method to reach its own
goals.
Therefore, Millar challenges the disjunctivist ’to spell out what ex-
actly is missing from an account of perception that explains seeing, for
instance, just in terms of having a suitably caused visual experience.’60
A similar objection is raised by Snowdon: ‘why cannot a single basic sort
of (inner) experience have quite different epistemological significance in
different cases, depending, say, on the context and on facts about cau-
sation?’61.
The response is this: under the causal theory of perception, percep-
tual experience cannot meet the justificatory standards, the fulfillment
of which puts the holy grail of epistemology in our hands. The theoret-
ical construction merging epistemological disjunctivism with the causal
theory of perception shoves our understanding of epistemic justification
from the golden mean to the externalist side of the debate, sustains the
internalism-externalism chasm and hides the holy grail from us.
On the causal theory of perception, the difference between the afore-
mentioned two subjectively indistinguishable experiences does not con-
cern their intrinsic natures, but causal chains that have led to them. At
the beginning of the causal chain that has led to a perceptual experience
there is a fact about the world or a mind-independent object, whereas
at the start of the causal chain that has led to a hallucination there is
no such fact or object.
It can be agreed that perceptual experience thus understood can be a
source of a factive epistemic justification. However, it is unlikely, to say
the least, that the mentioned fact (or the object) at the beginning of the
causal chain is reflectively accessible to the subject. What is in the range
of my conscious access is whatever counts as my experience, and if the
fact (or the object) is not present in it, then the epistemic justification
constituted by my perceptual relation with this fact or object is not
reflectively accessible to me.
As I understand epistemological disjunctivism, it is the very factivity
of justification that is supposed to be reflectively accessible. Otherwise
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this view would be just another kind of reliabilism. Such accessibility
is missing from the picture if we accept the Common Factor Principle.
What this principle generates is the so-called screening-off problem. It
starts from the assumption that a phenomenal character of a perception
P supervenes on a certain brain activity B. If a hallucination H has the
same phenomenal character as the perception P, then it supervenes on
the same brain activity B. So whatever the difference is between P and H,
be it the epistemic significance or the relation with a mind-independent
object, it gets screened-off by the phenomenal character that is shared
by both experiences62.
The aforementioned Millar’s theory, given its commitment to the
Common Factor Principle, is also susceptible to the screening-off prob-
lem. In spite of explaining the factivity, it does not fulfill the requirement
of reflective accessibility. In fact, Millar explicitly subscribes himself to
a certain sort of reliabilism63.
This is why I argue that the only way to get the holy grail is to
ground epistemological disjunctivism in its metaphysical counterpart. It
is true that both claims do not imply each other. Nonetheless, only
the assumption that an object perceived is a constituent of a perceptual
experience can plausibly motivate the claim that perception endues the
subject with an epistemic justification that is externally grounded and
reflectively accessible at the same time. Perceptual knowledge is a kind of
knowledge by acquaintance and it is only the direct acquaintance with a
fact (or an object) that can serve as a source of an epistemic justification
for such knowledge.
Admittedly, as it was mentioned in Part 1, this argument is based
on an abductive reasoning, and as such it could be falsified by showing
an alternative validation for epistemological disjunctivism at the level of
the philosophy of perception. This is doubtful, however, given that the
Common Factor Principle is accepted by all theories of perception other
than metaphysical disjunctivism64.
One thing that we should learn from Millar though is that the truth of
metaphysical disjunctivism is an insufficient condition for the possibility
of having a perceptual belief that counts as justified by the standard of
epistemological disjunctivism. This is because even an object-involving
experience has to be accurately conceptualized in order to become a
proper material for justification65. Being insufficient, the truth of meta-
physical disjunctivism still is a necessary condition.
Of course, making metaphysical disjunctivism a viable theory is an-
other problem and it is not at all obvious that this view will endure
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the tension of its numerous critics. In particular, a metaphysical dis-
junctivist has to deliver a convincing explanation for the possibility of
indistinguishable hallucinations mentioned above. However, I think that
there are plausible stories to tell here, so the holy grail of epistemology
is not completely out of our reach.
5 Conclusion
By subscribing to epistemological disjunctivism, one sets a certain stan-
dard for epistemic justification. Put differently, one endorses a certain
set of conditions that must be fulfilled in order to consider a given per-
ceptual belief as justified. An endorsement of such conditions obliges
one to show whether and how can they be fulfilled. This requires one to
embrace a certain standpoint in the field of philosophy of perception.
In the case of epistemological disjunctivism, understood as described
above, the possibility of fulfillment of its conditions for perceptual justi-
fication requires the truth of disjunctivism about perceptual experience
(a.k.a. metaphysical disjunctivism). This is why I claim that the plau-
sibility of epistemological disjunctivism depends on the plausibility of
metaphysical disjunctivism. If the latter is false, the former will be pos-
tulating a set of conditions for justification that are impossible to be
fulfilled.
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